United States v. Corrow

When Ray Winnie, a Navajo religious singer, participated in religious ceremonies, Ray would wear ceremonial masks. Upon Ray’s death, Richard Corrow (“Defendant”), owner of a cultural artifacts store, bought the masks from Ray’s widow, Fannie, for $10,000. Defendant told Fannie he would retain the masks sacredness by sending them to a Navajo chanter. Defendant tried to sell the masks to a buyer, who was an undercover agent, for $70,000. Subsequently, the United States government (“Plaintiff”) charged Defendant with illegally trafficking in Native American cultural items and selling protected feathers, under 18 U.S.C. § 1170 and the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”). Pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b), one may not knowingly sell or purchase for profit of a cultural item when it is obtained in violation of NAGPRA. Pursuant to Section 3001(3) of NAGPRA, a “cultural item” is a “cultural patrimony,” in part an object that was not previously owned by an individual Native American and could not be alienated, appropriated, or transferred by an individual. In trial, cultural experts established conflicting testimony regarding the alienability of the masks. Nonetheless, neither expert provided testimony indicating that it was acceptable for one to sell the masks to non-Navajos, who would later resell them for profit. Moreover, all experts provided evidence establishing that the masks that are sacred resided within the tribe’s four sacred mountains. The district court held Defendant was knowledgeable about Native traditions and Native culture because of Defendant’s representation to Fannie that he would transfer the masks to a chanter. Additionally, the expert testified that she had reminded Defendant of NAGPRA and the Navajo Nation’s procedures to return cultural items. Further, a jury found and convicted Defendant of trafficking and possession of protected feathers. Upon Defendant’s appeal, Defendant alleged that the definition of “cultural patrimony” was not constitutional, as it was unduly vague, as it did not provide the public notice about what specific conduct was prohibited nor did the statute list examples of cultural items.